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The Problem of Triple Contingency in Habermas 
 
PIET STRYDOM 
University College Cork 
 
ABSTRACT 
From a certain perspective, Habermas’ theory of communicative action is a response, in 
extension of Mead, Schutz and Parsons, to the risk of dissension posed by double 
contingency. Starting from double contingency, both The Theory of Communicative Action 
and Between Facts and Norms are essentially an elaboration of a solution to this problem in 
terms of a more fully developed theory of communication than had been available to his 
predecessors. Given the intense concentration and the immense expenditure of energy on the 
working out of the co-ordinating accomplishments and structures required by the complex 
solution envisaged by him, it is unsurprising that Habermas overlooks the next most 
important problem intermittently raised by the theory of communicative action, namely the 
problem of “triple contingency” - i.e., the contingency that the public brings into the social 
process. This has far-reaching implications for Habermas’ place in the sociological tradition 
and for the relation of the younger generation to him. Because of his continued search for a 
solution to a problem posed in the classical phase of sociology and his concomitant failure to 
develop the new problem that he himself raised in the course of so doing, he can be classified 
with Parsons as being a neo-classical sociologist. He nevertheless bequeaths a serious 
problem to contemporary sociology. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic concept of double contingency gives expression to a widely recognized proposition 
in sociological theory. Mead and Schutz established the theorem in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and Parsons, building on these foundations, eventually gave it its explicit 
formulation. In the second half of the twentieth century, leading social theorists such as 
Habermas and Luhmann reinforced its status as a basic concept by adopting the concept and 
including discussions of it in their major works. In his latest major work published in German 
and English as recently as in 1992 and 1996
1
 respectively, Habermas still emphatically 
accepts the theorem of double contingency. 
 
What I find remarkable is that, despite his concentration on double contingency, Habermas 
actually operates with a theoretical position that accommodates a higher degree of 
contingency. Through such matters as the public sphere, the public, the structure of 
communication, the system of perspectives and personal pronouns, and the third point of 
view, he often touches and even elaborates upon this form of contingency, yet he never 
acknowledges it as such nor gives it a name. It is the contingency that the public brings into 
communicative relations and hence into the social process, or what may be called ‘triple 
contingency’.2 Thus while writing eloquently about double contingency as well as the public 
sphere, Habermas surprisingly neglects to capture and clarify the role of the public in 
communication societies in a comparably sharp and defined manner. I suspect that this may 
be due to the fact that in his proposed stereoscopic stress on reconstruction and empirical 
description, validity and facticity, or norms and facts, he tends not merely to give too much 
weight to the former member of the pair but to draw the distinction in such a way that he 
claims too much on behalf of moral philosophy. More specifically, he tends to interpret the 
third point of view too strongly in terms of the idealised moral point of view than is good for 
the public who embodies and carries it. 
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In this paper, I propose to focus on the problem of triple contingency in Habermas’ recent 
major writings. To be able to do so in an intelligible way, I shall first give an overview of the 
original introduction and sense of the concept of double contingency in sociological theory. 
Against this background, it will then be possible to ferret out the submerged notion of triple 
contingency in Habermas, and to analyse the difficulties preventing him from explicitly 
acknowledging and developing it. In the course of the development of the argument, light 
will indirectly be thrown on the theoretical understanding of the role of the public in 
communication societies. 
 
I DOUBLE CONTINGENCY IN CLASSICAL AND NEO-CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY 
 
Symbolic Interactionist Foundation: George Herbert Mead 
The very core of George Herbert Mead’s work is occupied by the problem of what was only 
well after his death in 1931 called “double contingency”. This interpretation is corroborated 
by the editor of Mead’s unpublished writings when he submits that “Mead’s most profound 
insight consists in understanding that the significant symbol, the language symbol, consists of 
a gesture whose meaning is had by both the one who makes the gesture and the other to 
whom it is addressed. He spent most of his intellectual life unravelling the implications of 
this insight” (Miller 1982, pp. 10-11). This concern of his with the gap between two 
individuals and how it is bridged goes back to his synthesis of ideas regarding language and 
communication deriving from distinct intellectual traditions: the pragmatism of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, on the one hand, and German idealism, particularly as represented by Hegel’s 
concern with the dialectic of the “I” and Dilthey’s hermeneutics, on the other. 
 
Since he sought to trace symbolization at the human evolutionary level, i.e., phylogenetically, 
and the construction of the subjective and social worlds at the level of the child becoming an 
adult, i.e., ontogenetically, Mead dealt with this central question in different contexts (Mead 
1962, pp. 42-134, 135-226, 227-336). They ranged from the animal world or the situation of 
anthropogenesis to the communication situation, on the one hand, and from children’s play 
and competitive games to mature adult communication, on the other. Whereas he paid 
attention on the one extreme to what he called “the conversation of gestures” (p. 46) in which 
signals or vocal cries are exchanged, his real interest was in “speech or communication” (p. 
67) in which “the significant symbol” (pp. 45-6) or language provides the medium of contact 
between human individuals. Depending on the context, Mead employed two characteristic 
ways of trying to encapsulate the central problem of his concern. In one case, he typically 
referred to a gesture or symbol that calls out in the individual advancing it the same attitude 
towards its meaning as it calls out in the other individual participating with the first in a given 
social situation. This formulation of “one calling out the response in him- or herself that he or 
she calls out in another”, which occurs time and time again in the investigation into meaning 
in the phylogenetic part of Mind, Self, and Society, obviously fascinated Mead. In the 
investigation of the formation of the subjective and social worlds, however, he employed a 
formulation designed to capture the same phenomenon as it presented itself in ontogenetically 
relevant contexts with which he was apparently even more fascinated, namely variations on 
the phrase “taking the attitude of the other”. 
 
The fundamental question that Mead sought to answer, as he himself writes, is: “What is the 
basic mechanism whereby the social process goes on?” (Mead 1962, p. 13). To make this 
question palpable, he casts the social process in the form of a problem situation which he 
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gives a graphic formulation: “Dogs approaching each other in hostile attitude…walk around 
each other, growling and snapping, and waiting for the opportunity to attack. Here is a 
process out of which language might arise, that is, a certain attitude of one individual that 
calls out a response in the other, which in turn calls out a different approach and a different 
response, and so on indefinitely” (p. 14). Human beings find themselves in a similar situation. 
“We are reading the meaning of the conduct of other people…There is something that reveals 
to us what the purpose is - just the glance of an eye, the attitude of the body which leads to 
the response” (p. 14). But unlike animals, human beings are not confined to “the gesture” as 
the basic mechanism making possible an appropriate responses to one another’s conduct. 
They are able to make use of language to overcome the initial problem situation of coming 
face-to-face with one another. Language is the much more complex form of the mechanism 
whereby the social process is carried. Rather than simply “specific stimuli calling forth the 
socially appropriate responses of the second organism” (p. 14), it is “a symbol which answers 
to a meaning in the experience of the first individual and which also calls out that meaning in 
the second individual” (p. 46). Mead is even more specific regarding the speech or 
communication situation: “The process of addressing another person is a process of 
addressing himself as well, and of calling out the response he calls out in another; and the 
person who is addressed, in so far as he is conscious of what he is doing, does himself tend to 
make use of the same vocal gesture and so to call out in himself the response which the other 
calls out - at least to carry on the social process which involves that conduct” (pp. 108-9). 
While focusing on the elementary situation, Mead is also aware of the wider ramifications of 
language. It is what “has been responsible, ultimately, for the origin and growth of present 
human society and knowledge” (p. 14). 
Given the starting situation of two individuals who come face-to-face with each other and 
have to find a way of relating in an appropriate manner to one another, Mead is first of all 
interested in meaning. For it is the sameness, identity or universality of meaning (Mead 1962, 
pp. 75-90) that allows the resolution of the problem posed by the initial situation. Although in 
the first part of Mind, Self, and Society under the influence of Darwin speaking virtually 
consistently of the participants in the social process having to adapt or “adjust and readjust” 
to one another (e.g. pp. 46, 75), he has in mind the communicative or dialogical relation 
between individuals occupying the interchangeable roles of speaker and listener (pp. 67, 69, 
108-9, 139). They do not simply respond to one another in the same way, but, as Mead 
characteristically stresses, they put themselves in the place of the other (p. 270) or, 
differently, take the attitude of the other toward themselves (p. 90). They take over or 
internalize and mutually anticipate each other’s responses or mutually expect each other’s 
expectations. This is made possible by the fact that the individual, through the development 
of the self (pp. 173-78), is simultaneously a subject  - an “I” - and an object - a “Me” - not 
only to him- or herself but also to the other. Since the social process in which they are 
involved forms part of a larger community or society, they are furthermore led to generalize 
their mutual expectations. They take the attitudes of all others, of the community to which 
they belong as a whole, or the organized set of responses or expectations of society, thus 
orienting themselves toward one another through generally recognized social norms - what 
Mead famously called “the generalized other” (pp. 90, 154). For Mead, this concept pointed 
toward the possibility of a “universal human society” in which individuals would attain an 
unprecedented level of “social intelligence” (p. 310), communication would be made perfect, 
and democracy would take the form of “universal discourse” (p. 327). 
 
Phenomenological Foundation: Alfred Schutz 
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During the late 1920s, while Mead offered the lectures that were transcribed by students and 
eventually made up his famous posthumous work of 1934, Alfred Schutz was writing his 
Phenomenology of the Social World, published originally in Vienna in 1932, in which he 
dealt with comparable problems. Behind him lay also the German idealist tradition, 
particularly as represented by Husserlian phenomenology, but it would be almost another 
decade before he would come into contact with pragmatism on its home ground. Starting 
from Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness supplemented by Bergson, 
Schutz initiated a reconstruction of the structures of the world of everyday interaction, and 
thus in an innovative step anticipated the point of view of Husserl’s last writings dealing with 
the lifeword. Although he never rejected the transcendental approach to subjectivity, Schutz 
made a transition to a social phenomenology which focuses on intersubjectivity. It is by way 
of this concern of his that the problem of what Parsons later called “double contingency” 
came to occupy centre stage in his important early major work. Not only does he seek to 
clarify how reciprocity of perspectives, mutual understanding and social interaction or 
communication are possible, but he also endeavours to show how the structure of the social 
world is built up upon these foundations. 
 
Assuming that the social world is based on the concept of everyone and hence also the other, 
Schutz (1976, pp. 97-138) starts in his analysis of intersubjectivity from the situation of two 
individuals confronting one another and being faced with the problem of having to come to 
mutual understanding. A detailed reconstruction of the process in which they deal with this 
common problem leads him from their first groping attempts to perceive and interpret the 
other through signitive-symbolic representations offered by the other’s body as a field of 
expression to the establishment of a fully fledged communicatively mediated social 
relationship. Not unlike Mead, Schutz conceives of this trajectory as being marked out by 
signs or symbols such as gestures and facial expressions (p. 101), on the one extreme, and 
language as a system of signification which serves communication both as an expressive and 
an interpretative scheme (p. 122), on the other. The first and most basic requirement for the 
felicitous establishment of intersubjective understanding by these means is what Schutz, 
following Bergson, calls “simultaneity” (p. 103). The two individuals must make the 
necessary assumption that the internal time consciousness of the other has a structure similar 
to his or her own, so that their respective streams of consciousness or flows of duration 
become synchronized and eventually interlocked in social interaction within a face-to-face 
relationship. Once this temporal parallelism has been established, the spiral of give and take 
goes its way: “…I am attending to your actual conscious experiences themselves and not 
merely to my own lived experiences of you. Furthermore, as I watch you, I shall see that you 
are oriented to me, that you are seeking the subjective meanings of my words, my actions, 
and what I have in mind insofar as you are concerned. And I will in turn take account of the 
fact that you are thus oriented to me, and this will influence both my intentions with respect 
to you and how I act toward you. This again you will see, I will see that you have seen it, and 
so on” (p. 170). Schutz regards the intersubjective understanding achieved on this basis, again 
comparable to Mead when he talks of putting oneself in the place of the other or of taking the 
attitude of the other, as either involving “put(ting) ourselves in the place of the actor” (p. 
114), in the case of understanding without communicative intent, or “identifying (one)self 
with the experiences (of the other)” (p. 115), in the case of a common communicative 
situation. 
 
Considered somewhat more formally, Schutz’s position on intersubjective understanding, 
particularly the problem situation of what would later become known as double contingency 
at the heart of intersubjectivity, can be reconstructed as a layered model. Precisely how many 
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levels it traverses is difficult to judge from his account, but in its social phenomenological or 
mundane form it consists of six - at times overlapping - dimensions. This model presupposes 
what Schutz calls “the general thesis of the alter ego” (pp. 97, 165), which expresses the 
assumption that since the individual is born into a social world the experience of the 
community or “the We” precedes the experience of the ego. From this soil arises at the 
deepest level of the model first the “Other-orientation” (p. 146) in the sense of the positing of 
the existence of the other. In so far as the individual becomes intentionally conscious or 
aware of the presence of the other, this orientation is secondly transformed into the “pure 
Thou-orientation” (p. 163). When this orientation assumes a reciprocal form, Schutz speaks 
thirdly of the “pure We-relationship” (pp. 164, 167-8). In this case, two individuals are aware 
of each other’s presence and have knowledge of the fact that the other is aware of him or her. 
The addition of the personal characteristics and traits of the other leads, in the fourth instance, 
from the Thou-orientation in its pure form to its actualized and determinate form (p. 164). 
Fifthly, it is only when the two individuals actually turn toward one another, take into 
account each other’s subjective contexts of meaning and mutually experience their 
simultaneity or common stream of consciousness by taking the roles of speaker and listener 
or questioner and answerer that a “concretized and actualized…(or simply)…concrete We-
relationship” (pp. 164, 168) results, which for Schutz is synonymous with a full social 
relationship or what he also calls the “face-to-face relationship” (pp. 167, 169). Finally, it is 
possible for the partners not simply to participate with undivided attention and thus to be 
submerged in a We-relationship, but also to step back from participation and to reflect on the 
relationship itself (pp. 167, 168). Rather than being confined to being participants, they could 
also assume the role of participants who observe themselves both individually and mutually - 
analogous to Mead’s “I” and “Me” in an interactive relationship within an external world 
they experience directly. At issue at this highest level, then, is the relational problem of two 
individuals who are subject and object both for themselves and for the other, on the one hand, 
and the nature of their relation, on the other. Although Schutz was not yet able to couch it in 
such terms, this model of his can be taken to suggest not only what is entailed by the problem 
of double contingency, but also what the two individuals involved would be required to do to 
overcome it. Considered from the uppermost level of the model, the problem of double 
contingency is given with the fact that the one’s perspective on his or her relationship to the 
other is contingent on the other’s perspective and vice versa. Were the two partners to deal 
adequately with this problem so as to be able to establish a felicitous social relationship, then 
they would have to articulate and co-ordinate two self-other complexes (Schutz himself 
speaks of co-ordination, pp. 119, 131). 
 
It is apparent that Schutz is clear about both the paradoxical and the reflexive nature of the 
problem situation of double contingency. The basic reference point is the dialogical situation 
in which two individuals in turn take the interchangeable roles of speaker and listener (p. 
127) or questioner and answerer (p. 161). The principle of simultaneity and the general thesis 
of the alter ego capture the paradoxical state of affairs in which two distinct individuals who 
confront one another as subjects demanding mutual recognition of their uniqueness, are 
required to regard each other as identical in the sense of having the same structural features 
and as being capable of assuming the same roles. Making use of his own distinction between 
“in-order-to motives” (i.e., expectations giving action its orientation) and “because-motives” 
(i.e., past experiences conditioning the present), he is able to show not only the mutual 
reflexivity of expectations, i.e., how one expects the expectations of the other, but also how 
one identifies with those expectations to such an extent that they condition his or her own 
action (p. 162). 
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That Schutz elaborates on the specific experience and knowledge of the other encountered 
under the risky contingent conditions of a given social situation (pp. 169, 171-2) does not 
deter him from stressing the crucial significance of the “stock of knowledge” or “interpretive 
schemes” learned and acquired through experience (pp. 80-3, 162, 169). These schemes, 
which provide meaning contexts for all further experience, structure and guide the 
individual’s expectations, interpretation of signs, and dealings with the other and the external 
world. At this point, a sharp difference between Schutz and Mead becomes apparent. The 
normative implications that Mead associated with his view of the sameness, identity, 
universality of meaning, particularly those connected with social intelligence and democracy, 
are conspicuously absent in Schutz. Although he mentions the formal logical as well as the 
practical and ethical dimensions of these schemes (p. 81), he proceeds in a quite 
undifferentiated way. This can be attributed to his typical phenomenological emphasis on 
cultural knowledge. Focusing on the identity of meaning achieved in a given social situation 
through the activation of a taken-for-granted pre-constituted stock of knowledge, he gives 
priority to intersubjective or mutual understanding conceived in a cultural sense rather than in 
terms of social norms or normative principles. 
 
Formulation of the Concept: Talcott Parsons 
Talcott Parsons was the first to name and to give precise formulation to what he called “the 
fundamental proposition of double contingency of interaction” (Parsons 1977, p. 167). This 
was done in 1951 in the almost simultaneously appearing Toward a General Theory of 
Action, an anthology edited with Edward Shils, and The Social System. He finally restated 
his position in 1968 in a contribution to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 
entitled “Social Interaction”, which was later included in one of his last collections, Social 
Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory (1977). In the latter essay, Parsons offers a lucid 
overview of the complicated history of the concept of social interaction and its theoretical 
context. In addition to older historical theories, special mention is made of American 
pragmatism and European existentialism, including phenomenology, as two very influential 
theoretical traditions that have shaped the field in a decisive way. What is remarkable about 
his account, is that Parsons gives phenomenology short shrift and, despite Schutz’s incisive 
analysis, does not refer to the Austro-American at all. That he nevertheless had Schutz in 
mind is suggested by the fact that he mentions Erving Goffman who, in his opinion, has 
brought together “a Meadian symbolic interactionism and a phenomenological viewpoint” 
(1977, p. 166).
3
 There can be no doubt about the fact that Mead as well as the conspicuously 
absent Schutz had prepared the ground for Parsons’ identification and formulation of the 
theorem or fundamental proposition of double contingency. 
 
In the essay of 1968, Parsons (1977, pp. 154-76, particularly pp. 167-68) introduces double 
contingency within the context of an account of social interaction and discusses it more 
specifically in relation to dyadic interaction. The fact that he chooses a limiting case as his 
reference point serves as an indication that he understands himself as being confronted with 
the task of having to clarify fundamental matters of much theoretical significance. This was 
reflected earlier already in the two contributions of 1951. In Toward a General Theory of 
Action (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 16), the concept of double contingency is put forward in 
the “General Statement” which was designed to serve as a programmatic introduction to a 
general theory of the social sciences and to lay down some basic theoretical principles. In The 
Social System (Parsons 1964, pp. 10, 36, 48, 94), double contingency is introduced in a 
comparable manner to underline the deep theoretical sense of the concept. Parsons clearly 
regarded double contingency as a theoretical concept that was necessary to account at a basic 
level for the possibility of social interaction or communication and, by extension, of social 
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order. On the one hand, double contingency draws attention to the potential hazard of conflict 
between individuals confronting each other face-to-face, and on the other it points toward 
accomplishments that could lead to co-operation and sharing (1964, p. 48). As such he saw it 
as an unavoidable basic condition that generated a problem at the social level which required 
a solution if social action, social interaction, social order and hence society were to be 
possible. 
 
Assuming a dyadic relation while acknowledging that it presupposes a common culture, 
Parsons starts from what he regards as the two most crucial reference points for an analysis of 
social interaction: “(1) that each actor is both acting agent and object of orientation both to 
himself and to others; and (2) that, as acting agent, he orients to himself and to others and, as 
object, has meaning to himself and to others, in all of the primary modes or aspects. The actor 
is knower and object of cognition, utilizer of instrumental means and himself a means, 
emotionally attached to others and an object of attachment, evaluator and object of 
evaluation, interpreter of symbols and himself a symbol” (Parsons 1977, p. 167). From these 
two reference points, which unmistakably build on Mead’s and Schutz’s achievements but 
are differentiated by means of his Neo-Kantian concept of culture, Parsons then derives the 
theorem of double contingency: “Not only, as for isolated behaving units, animal or human, 
is a goal outcome contingent on successful cognition and manipulation of environmental 
objects by the actors, but since the most important objects involved in interaction act too, it is 
also contingent on their action or intervention in the course of events” (p. 167). The double 
contingency at issue here, i.e., the double contingency specifically of interaction, does not 
consist of the two contingencies explicitly mentioned, as the formulation might be taken to 
suggest, but is connected with the word “their” italicized by Parsons. By way of his layered 
model reconstructed above, Schutz’s had already made clear that the issue is the interrelation 
of two self-other complexes. Parsons’ other explications of the concept bear out that this is 
how he understands double contingency. 
 
On the original introduction the concept in the early fifties, Parsons stated the proposition of 
double contingency in the following form: “There is a double contingency inherent in 
interaction. On the one hand, ego’s gratifications are contingent on his selection among 
available alternatives. But in turn, alter’s reaction will be contingent on ego’s selection and 
will result from a complementary selection on alter’s part” (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 16). 
Shortly after in The Social System, he once again identified the two “contingency factors” 
that result in double contingency: the contingency of what an actor actually does in the 
context of an elementary interaction situation, and the contingency of the other’s reaction to 
what is being done (Parsons 1964, p. 94). To summarize, two actors encounter one another in 
a social situation. Ego and alter are different from each other and the situation in which they 
encounter one another is a socially undetermined one in which social interaction remains 
impossible, unless they are able to deal with and sufficiently overcome the lack of 
determination and hence the differences between them. Whatever each does in this open, 
empty, indeterminate situation depends on what each chooses to do and on what the other 
actually does. For both, besides their respective systems of alternatives, the situation is 
equally undetermined in that each could choose this way or that and could decide to act or 
react this way or that. Both actors are moreover equally uncertain, for both are potentially 
unlimited sources of words and actions. Any and every instance of interaction between two 
social actors necessarily takes place under such conditions of double contingency. 
 
In The Social System, Parsons (1964, pp. 10-11) underlines the centrality of double 
contingency by suggesting that it is closely related to the indissoluble relation between 
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symbolization and interaction. Let us attempt to reconstruct the suggested position. The basic 
reference point for Parsons is that while symbolization is impossible without the interaction 
of actors, the individual actor is unable, vice versa, to acquire a symbolic system without 
interaction with others. Double contingency occupies the centre of this nexus in so far as it 
poses a problem, on the one hand, but at the same time also demands a solution, on the other. 
When two actors encounter one another in an indeterminate situation and ego begins to adopt 
an elementary orientation toward alter, then ego engages in signification or symbolization. 
This means that ego is bringing into play an expectation that necessarily involves abstraction 
or generalization from the particularities of the situation. The expectation that ego brings into 
play here in the form of symbolization, is one that ego has acquired through interaction with 
others. Whence its potential transcendence of the particular situation in which ego and alter 
find themselves. When alter now reacts to ego in contingency on ego’s proposal, alter also 
articulates an expectation and thus engages in a further step of symbolization which 
reinforces the structuring effect of the first symbolization step. Two actors who have acquired 
a symbolic system or culture in the medium of social interaction, act and react in particular 
ways in a specific situation such that they thereby activate relatively stable and more or less 
shared symbolic or cultural forms which give the situation a sufficiently abstract or 
generalized meaning to make communication possible between the two partners. 
 
Proceeding from this theoretical basis, Parsons gives a particular interpretation of 
generalization from the particularity of the specific situation and of identity of meaning 
across the range of contingent alternatives available in the situation. The direction of the 
move he makes, which is not untypical of the sociology of the first half of the twentieth 
century, is already suggested by his interpretation of the symbolization-interaction relation in 
terms of the integration of motivation and normative culture, but it becomes fully clear when 
he has to find a solution to the problem posed by the fact of double contingency, i.e., when he 
has to face such questions as: How do two actors who encounter each other in a situation of 
interaction relate to one another? What allows the two actors to make a selection from among 
available alternatives? On what basis are their respective performative contributions 
interrelated and coordinated? How is communication between ego and alter possible? 
Parsons’ solution to the problem of double contingency takes the form of cultural 
determination (Parsons 1964, pp. 11, 37-8; Parsons 1977, pp. 168-9). Culture, which is 
always already available as a shared system, penetrates action orientations to such an extent 
that the existence of a value consensus can be assumed. On the one hand, it provides shared 
symbols or elements of tradition that control general systems of orientation. On the other 
hand, cultural patterns of value are internalised and institutionalised so as to become part of 
personalities and interaction systems as need dispositions and role expectations respectively. 
When two actors, who are motivated by their culturally defined needs, face one another in a 
particular situation which is nevertheless generally delineated by cultural symbols, they are 
thus able to relate to each other or to enter into social interaction due to the correspondence 
between or overlap of the role expectations or normative orientations they had acquired 
through socialisation. 
 
II CONTINGENCY IN HABERMAS 
 
Habermas on Double Contingency 
The first impression one gets on reading Habermas’ (1981, pp. 319-22; 1987, pp. 213-15) 
discussion of double contingency is that he rejects it as a pseudo-theoretical problem which 
has been generated by unacceptable empiricist, individualist and utilitarian assumptions. 
This, in any event, is how he interprets Parsons’ introduction of the theorem with reference to 
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elementary interaction. As the reader proceeds, however, it becomes apparent that Habermas 
is willing to accept it on the basis of changed presuppositions. Instead of defining double 
contingency in terms of the voluntaristic free choice of ego and alter, as Parsons according to 
him does, he regards the theorem as invoking actors who are capable of decisions in the sense 
of taking yes or no positions on validity claims advanced in linguistic communication - 
particularly important to him being the ability to say no (1987, p. 74). Not only is there 
something such as the “doubly contingent relation”, then, but he also accepts Parsons’ 
suggestion that it poses a problem which requires ordering accomplishments - for him, the 
co-ordination of action. What he apparently quietly took over in the course of argumentation 
in The Theory of Communicative Action, he some years later emphatically accepts: “I 
assume with Parsons that social interactions linked in space and time are subject to conditions 
of double contingency” (Habermas 1997, p. 139). Here he leaves no doubt whatsoever about 
where he stands on the matter. 
 
Proceeding from these observations, I would venture to submit that Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action is a response, in extension of Mead, Schutz and Parsons, to the 
problem posed by double contingency. Starting from yet redefining double contingency, The 
Theory of Communicative Action is essentially an elaboration of a solution to the problem in 
terms of a more fully developed version of the theory of communication than had been 
available to his predecessors. Between Facts and Norms (1997), which is conceived as an 
extension of the theory of communicative action, invites a similar interpretation. It starts 
explicitly (pp. 33-4, 36, 37) from double contingency and seeks to develop a solution to the 
problem it poses in terms of modern law. At the same time, the theoretical tour de force of 
these works also opens up a perspective on a problem that henceforth would become virulent 
in his work. Given the intense concentration and the immense expenditure of energy on the 
working out of the co-ordinating and ordering accomplishments and structures required by 
the complex solution envisaged by him, it does not comes as a surprise that Habermas 
overlooks this next most important problem raised by the theory of communication, namely 
the problem of “triple contingency”. Between Facts and Norms as well as the later Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen (1996) differ from The Theory of Communicative Action in so far 
as these books contain evidence that it is becoming increasingly difficult for him to ignore 
this problem. The fact that Habermas does not acknowledge and explicitly take up this new 
problem, particularly in the sociologically relevant sections of his major works, has far-
reaching implications for his place in the sociological tradition and for the relation of the 
younger generation to him. Because of his continued search for a solution to a problem posed 
in the classical phase of sociology and his concomitant failure to develop the new problem 
that he himself raises in the course of so doing, Habermas can be classified with Parsons as 
being a neo-classical sociologist. The problem that he bequeaths to contemporary sociology 
is that of triple contingency. 
 
Habermas’ particular position on double contingency owes everything to an extrapolation and 
penetrating analysis of the implications of the communication theoretical approach far 
beyond Mead, Schutz and Parsons. In developing this approach, he was able to draw on the 
long-standing concern with language in the German philosophical tradition, the twentieth 
century linguistic turn, and in particular the inspiring interpretations of Pierce and 
Wittgenstein by his friend Karl-Otto Apel (Habermas 1997a, pp. 84-97). 
 
In his reconstruction of Mead’s symbolic interactionism, Habermas follows three distinct 
strands that allow him to delineate the problem of contingency,
4
 while pinpointing both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the American author’s theory of communication.5 The strands 
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are those leading first from the gesture via symbolically mediated to linguistically mediated 
communication, secondly from context-bound signs to meaning conventions securing the 
identity of meaning in symbolization, and the third from instinctual to cultural, linguistic 
modes of the coordination of action. By giving attention in an innovative way to these various 
developments, Mead succeeded in introducing a paradigm shift that deservedly earned him 
the status of a founder of the modern social sciences, but Habermas nevertheless discovers a 
number of gaps in his path-breaking analysis that weaken his theory of communication. In 
addition to failing to develop his concept of language in an adequately differentiated way 
(Habermas 1987, p. 28), Mead pursued neither the significance of meaning conventions (p. 
15) nor the reaching of understanding through communication far enough (p. 28). These 
weaknesses go back to Mead’s attachment to points of view deriving from epistemology, 
behaviourism and psychology which blocked the full development of a communication 
theoretic understanding. As regards the problem of how the actions of ego and alter 
confronting each other in a social situation could be co-ordinated, for instance, Habermas (p. 
26) insists that Mead never struck on the illocutionary binding effect contained in linguistic 
utterances. Similarly, his significant contribution under the title of “the generalized other” 
also suffers from a flaw. Not only did he fail to differentiate sufficiently the socio-cognitive 
and moral points of view implied by this concept (p. 36), but he was not clear enough about 
the moral dimension, particularly the validity status of norms (p. 38). This weakness can be 
traced to Mead’s neglect of the phylogenesis of moral authority (p. 44). In Habermas’ view, 
the various lacunae in Mead work can be filled by a communications theoretic position that is 
internally adequately articulated and consistently developed at both an ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic level. 
 
Habermas’ (1987, pp. 126-34) analysis of Schutz from the point of view of his contribution to 
a communication theoretic concept of the lifeworld gives him the opportunity to appropriate a 
concept of cultural background knowledge that provides resources for the interpretative 
negotiation of common definitions of action situations, on the one hand, and is in turn 
reproduced through the communicative action and mutual understanding such interpretative 
accomplishments entail, on the other.
6
 A significant aspect of Schutz’s work for him, 
therefore, is his communicative concept of action in the sense of the interpretation of a 
situation and the establishment of mutual understanding. The need for this concept derives 
from what Schutz appreciates as the fundamental problem of intersubjectivity, which 
Habermas accepts as relating the “the question of how different subjects can share the same 
lifeworld” (p. 129) and of how they can avoid “the risk of not coming to some understanding, 
that is, of disagreement or misunderstanding” (p. 127). In keeping with his endorsement of 
the concept of double contingency, Habermas acknowledges that Schutz, by way of his 
concern with the risk of disagreement or misunderstanding and its avoidance by the 
establishment of mutual understanding, is touching on a necessary condition of the social 
world. Despite this significant contribution, however, Schutz failed to realize the full 
potential of his position. The basic problem, according to Habermas (1987, pp. 129, 130), is 
that Schutz’s attachment to Husserlian phenomenology, in spite of his focus on the 
intersubjective social world, not only kept him within the bounds of the philosophy of 
consciousness but also prevented him from fully adopting the communication theoretic 
approach. Consequently, his work suffered from being located in an ambivalent position. 
Were this difficulty to be eliminated, according to Habermas’ proposal, then the structures of 
the lifeworld would have to be understood from the start and throughout in terms of the 
structures of intersubjectivity generated by linguistic communication. 
 
Published in Sociological Theory 19(2), 2001, pp. 165-86. 
 
11 
 
Earlier, I have argued that Habermas takes over the theorem of double contingency from 
Parsons, yet not without rejecting the voluntarism, together with its empiricist, individualist 
and utilitarian connotations, on foot of which it had originally been introduced and replacing 
it by a communication theoretic basis. Having accepted this principle, he (1987, pp. 215-56) 
then fights a running battle against the ever new permutations of Parsons’ solution to the 
problem generated by the fact of double contingency, all of which turn on the concept of 
culture. During the early phase of his intellectual development, Parsons argued against the 
heteronomy of ends and in favour of the integrity of the social by attributing cultural value 
standards to individual actors and demonstrating the need for their harmonization (p. 214). It 
is this kind of thinking that still shaped his introduction of the fundamental proposition of 
double contingency. It underwent a relatively drastic change in his early middle phase, 
however, when cultural anthropology assisted him to develop a concept of culture that 
allowed him to conceive of the cultural determination of action orientations (p. 217). 
Common cultural patterns, which were differentiated along neo-Kantian lines into 
interpretative, evaluative and expressive components, were depicted as regulatives that 
through internalization and institutionalization penetrate into motives and role expectations 
respectively. The manner in which cultural values structure an actor’s scope of choice 
between alternatives yet leaves open the contingency of decisions was captured by the 
concept of “pattern variables”. Parsons here ascribed a special status to culture by defining it 
as an external, free-floating complex of meaning possessing its own coherence and 
consistency as well as a certain control function. Habermas (1987, pp, 221, 226, 254) 
relentlessly criticizes this as a reification of culture which he accounts for with reference to 
Parsons’ neo-Kantian predilection and his related choice of the inappropriate epistemological 
model. Later, when Parsons exchanged structural functionalism for systems functionalism, he 
retained the conception of culture as a transcendent system of semantically related values 
possessing validity. It was only in his last period, characterized by his acceptance of the 
primacy of systems theory, that he was compelled to surrender the claim of special status on 
behalf of culture. Instead of neo-Kantianism, systems theory now dictated that culture be 
regarded as one sub-system of the general action system among others. Calling cybernetics to 
his assistance, however, he nevertheless managed to ascribe anew a steering function to the 
cultural system by means of the hierarchical control that information exerts over energy 
expenditure. In this way, he finally believed himself once again able to secure a determining 
force for culture (pp. 248-49). In Habermas’ estimation, a better solution to the problem 
following from double contingency than is offered by this epistemologically conceived, past-
oriented, static and objectivist reified concept of culture has to be sought for in the 
“communications-theoretic model of speaking and acting subjects (p. 254). 
 
From Double to Triple Contingency 
Habermas grants that, in one way or another, his predecessors all saw the relevance of 
language and communication, yet neither Mead nor Schutz and even less Parsons fully 
embraced this insight, not to mention fully exploited its potential. Language as the primary 
means for the transmission of culture as well as the communicative dimension of action co-
ordination should be taken more seriously that any of them realized. According to his 
proposed communication theoretic model, double contingency should be conceived from the 
start as the relational problem of communicatively acting subjects rather than human beings 
without a fully differentiated propositional language, as in Mead, or intuitively proceeding 
and overly subjectivist actors, as in Schutz, or monadic actors whose contingent choices 
between alternatives are regulated by preferences, as in Parsons. Mead’s position on meaning 
conventions and the co-ordination of action could be improved and Parsons’ reified concept 
of culture could be dissolved if a Schutzian view is adopted according to which the emphasis 
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is placed on interpretative acts oriented toward mutual understanding as the means whereby 
transmitted culture is appropriated and common situational definitions are arrived at. For 
Habermas (1987, p. 220) this means that the twofold function of culture should at all times be 
appreciated, that is, its context-generating function of providing the unquestioned background 
against which communicatively acting subjects confront each other and are compelled to 
construct common situation definitions, and its text-generating function of inserting 
individual cultural patterns into the semantic content of utterances and thus providing 
knowledge that is criticizable. It is particularly at this text-generating level that Habermas 
makes his most characteristic and most decisive contribution which goes far beyond all his 
predecessors. The problem of the co-ordination of action raised by the fact of double 
contingency, which opposes two communicatively acting subjects capable of taking a 
decision about a yes or no position on a linguistic offer, can be solved by conceiving of the 
participants as being oriented toward validity claims raised in their communication (p. 215). 
Unlike Mead who did not sufficiently appreciate the propositionally differentiated nature of 
language and hence proceeded to fix on relatively vague symbols, Habermas distinguishes 
and clarifies the illocutionary force of the full range of linguistic utterances, from a statement 
of fact through giving a command to expressing a feeling. Unlike Schutz (1976, p. 130) who 
indeed recognized the importance of the reasons underlying communicative offers yet left 
them essentially unanalysed under the title of the “in-order-to-motive” of communication, 
Habermas analyses the rationality of speaking subjects and ferrets out the full range of 
validity claims that they at least implicitly advance in their communication. Finally, unlike 
Parsons who located validity in the consistency requirements of a free-floating, transcendent 
cultural realm and thus failed to plausibly explain how it could become factically effective, 
Habermas (1987, pp. 231; 1997, pp, 18-19) makes the far-reaching proposal to bring validity 
claims down from heaven and to incorporate them from the start into empirical contexts of 
action. 
 
Building on his own understanding of double contingency as the relation of communicatively 
acting subjects who do not know whether to expect a yes or a no response from the other on 
making a communicative offer, Habermas develops his position by drawing on Hegel’s 
analysis of the “dialectics of the I” (Habermas 1974, pp. 144-47; 1971, p. 193), on Schutz’s 
analysis of intersubjectivity in terms of reciprocally interlocked perspectives and roles within 
the same communicative context (Habermas 1988, p. 106) and on Mead’s analysis of the 
change in perspective accompanying the transition from play to game (1978, pp. 35-36).The 
result is a clarification of the structure of communication that goes well beyond double 
contingency and the relational problem of ego and alter. It therefore also serves him as a basis 
for a critique of dialogical philosophy (Habermas 1997a, pp. 133-34) in so far as it proceeds 
from a selective understanding of communication and exchanges the traditional 
epistemological subject-object relation for the communicative I-Thou relation. Formally, 
Habermas’ analysis of the structure of communication highlights the perspectives or roles, 
the attitudes and the system of personal pronouns involved in communication, but it is also 
here that he implicitly begins to raise the problem of triple contingency. This problem, to be 
sure, has been dormant in his writings since his first major work, Strukturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit (1969), which was originally published in 1962 and became available in 
English in 1989 entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, but it is 
particularly in his most recent work, Between Facts and Norms ([1992] 1997) and in the later 
collection, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (1996), that it begins to assert itself in what seem 
to be an uncontrolled manner. 
 
Published in Sociological Theory 19(2), 2001, pp. 165-86. 
 
13 
 
In the relation of double contingency, two communicatively acting subjects, ego and alter, are 
faced with the problem of taking up the communicative roles of speaker and hearer. If they 
succeed in overcoming these contingency conditions, the interchangeable perspectives of 
speaker and hearer become intermeshed in such a way that two co-ordinated ego-alter circles 
or perspectives of participation result. The participants’ awareness is not exhausted by 
concentrating solely on themselves and on the other opposite them, however, since at the 
same time both are also able to relate to the world of perceptible and manipulable objects 
around them. Were they not able to do so, they would not have been able to participate fully 
in communication. This ability implies that, in addition to the perspectives of speaker and 
hearer, another perspective comes into play in the development beyond the double 
contingency relation. This is the perspective of the observer. When this perspective enters 
social interaction, ego is able to take an attitude that allows him or her to divide alter’s 
communicative role in two, the role of alter ego in the sense of a participating counterpart and 
the role of a neutral or non-participating onlooker or observer belonging to the group forming 
part of the social situation. As a consequence of this structural differentiation made possible 
by the adoption of an objectifying attitude in addition to a performative attitude, the 
perspectives of speaker and hearer are relativized vis-à-vis a third perspective. The first 
person who is speaking and the second person who is addressed and responds show up 
against the background of the uninvolved third person. The emergence of this basic triad 
marks the structure of communication that takes place in a social group within a situation in 
the real world. Such communication is mediated by the system of personal pronouns that 
allows not only an “I” to relate to a “you” or “thou” as well as to a “him”, “her” or “them”, 
but also others in the role of second person or third person to relate to a “me”. 
 
For Habermas, the most important point that follows from this analysis of the structure of 
communication concerns the implications of the differentiation of the third person point of 
view for the relation to the other. This means that relations are now being touched on that 
imply a shift from double to triple contingency. While the new category of taking the attitude 
of the other that now becomes apparent is related to what Mead called “the generalized 
other”, Habermas (1987, pp. 35-40) nevertheless criticizes Mead for not grasping it in its full 
sense, and therefore he brings Durkheim in to support an extended version. Mead did not 
make a clear distinction between the socio-cognitive and moral dimensions of generalized 
and hence valid social norms, and as a consequence he neglected to come to grips with 
normative validity in the sense of the obligatory character of valid norms in a manner 
approaching Durkheim. The criticism of Mead also applies to Schutz, who operated with a 
culturalist concept of the lifeworld to the exclusion, among other things, of the question 
concerning the social norms at issue in institutionalization and social solidarity (Habermas 
1987, p. 139). 
 
Socio-cognitively, the individual learns in the course of ontogenesis and socialization to 
objectify the reciprocal interrelation of participant perspectives from the perspective of the 
observer and thus to adopt an objectifying attitude toward his or her own interaction with 
alter ego. Once the individual is able to do this, he or she distinguishes ego’s and alter’s 
system of interchangeable, interrelated participant perspectives from the particular situation 
in which they find themselves, and appreciates that the system of perspectives is a general 
one that anyone would have to adopt were he or she to take the places of ego and alter. By 
being generalized, a concrete pattern of action is thus transposed into a rule of conduct or a 
norm. At the same time, the individual also understands that the will, interests and possible 
sanctions that enter ego’s and alter’s interaction as imperative force are not particularities 
attaching to ego and alter but are rather tied up with the larger collectivity or group to which 
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they belong. It is a group-specific generalized imperative that rests on a collective choice 
related to the maintenance of collective interests. 
 
Habermas (1987, p. 37; 1996, pp. 14-15, 20-22) is critical of non-cognitivist empiricist and 
weak cognitivist contextual moral theories since both accept, albeit in different ways, the 
result of the socio-cognitive development sketched above as being definitive. This leads them 
to emphasize the collective regulation of the choices of participants in social interaction who 
co-ordinate their actions through collectively endorsed sanctions and the reciprocal 
satisfaction of interests, as in empiricist ethics, or the reciprocal reproduction of strong 
values, as in contextual ethics. What they overlook is the obligatory character of social norms 
or normative validity - “the categorial validity claim of moral obligations” or “the epistemic 
core of normative validity” (1996, p. 15) which becomes apparent only when one recognizes 
“the third point of view” (1996, pp. 106, 109, 114, 120, 122, 125) in the sense of the moral 
point of view from which intentions and policies can be judged in a context-independent and 
impartial way. This is the Kantian position articulated earlier by Durkheim and today, albeit 
softened through communication, by Habermas himself. In this case, the imperativistic 
authority attaching to the collective will and collective choice of a particular social groups or 
larger unit is transformed through internalization, and thus insight and assent, into normative 
authority which no longer admits of being identified with a particular social unit due to its in 
principle universalistic character. This coincides with Mead’s “generalized other” in its 
proper sense. In terms of Habermas’(1996, pp. 15, 39, 117, 120) approach, this moral point of 
view possessing epistemic and thus post-metaphysical authority is a reconstruction of the 
point of view that the members of post-traditional societies themselves assume when they are 
required under the conditions of the problematization or breakdown of moral norms to have 
recourse to epistemic grounds or reasons which, in turn, should not be confused with the 
actors’ motives. 
 
The Problem of Triple Contingency 
I argued above that, paradoxically, Habermas inadvertently raised the problem of triple 
contingency in the course of his analysis of the structure of communication which was aimed 
at the solution of the problem posed by the fact of double contingency. The problem of the 
higher level contingency was brought to the fore when the analysis, in moving beyond the 
relation of double contingency, uncovered the differentiation of the structure of 
communication which led to the emergence of the third person perspective. This means that 
triple contingency is connected with the triadic structure of communication. Although not 
recognizing it as such, Habermas did begin to touch on the problem through the classical 
contributions of Mead, Schutz and Durkheim. While the works of the former two registered 
the process of the structural differentiation of communication by means of the complex of 
socio-cognitive concepts encapsulating the system of perspectives, attitudes and personal 
pronouns mediating communication in social units, the latter pointed toward the moral 
dimension. Already the fact that Habermas tends to proceed from here to emphasize the 
moral dimension to the exclusion of all else suggests that he does not deal with the problem 
of triple contingency. But when he, despite numerous difficulties prompting him to change 
tack, continues to fail to offer a consistent approach, one begins to suspect that he does not 
recognize the problem as such. The Theory of Communicative Action gives evidence of his 
ambivalence, which is compounded in Between Facts and Norms and in Die Einbeziehung 
des Anderen. The latter is particularly interesting in so far as it contains an explicit attempt to 
come grips with the proper location of “the third point of view”. 
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Before considering Habermas’ difficulties in these three works, however, let us take a 
preliminary look at what triple contingency involves. In the case of double contingency, as 
we have seen, two social actors or communicatively acting subjects, A and B, face or 
encounter one another and enter into some relation with each other as “I” and “Thou”. In the 
basic situation of triple contingency, by contrast, there is a third perspective, borne by C, who 
observes what A and B are saying and doing. C is indeed a non-participating observer or 
onlooker, as Habermas submits, but C is not simply a “neuter” (Habermas 1987, p. 35) in the 
sense of a neutral and uninvolved third person who at best allows or compels A and B to 
adopt an objectifying attitude toward their own interaction. Although not participating, C 
does have a certain if indirect involvement. In fact, C has a constitutive significance for the 
social situation as such. Habermas would indeed seem to recognize this constitutive sense 
through Mead’s “generalized other”, but why does he persist in taking the twofold I-Thou 
relation as representing the elementary social situation whereas it is actually the threefold 
configuration that for the first time establishes it? Why does he start in both his last two 
major theoretical works - The Theory of Communicative Action and Between Facts and 
Norms - from double contingency? 
 
To the triadic configuration, furthermore, applies a higher degree of contingency. In the case 
of double contingency, two actors or subjects, A and B, are both compelled to make a 
selection from alternatives while taking alter ego into account, and thus to establish a relation 
between themselves. The inclusion of the third person point of view, represented by C, means 
that the social situation in the case of triple contingency is very different and more 
complicated from the start. It is not simply a matter of the aggregation of elementary 
interaction. To the extent that the observer, C, belongs to the situation as a constitutive part of 
its sociality, the third point of view standing behind or over and above A and B represents 
society. It embodies the societal power of definition. C has a constitutive social role in that 
he, she or it has the power to define the situation. Whatever A and B say and do, therefore, 
must in principle make sense to C. From the start and throughout, A and B are subject in their 
interrelations to meanings and norms as defined by society and represented by the observer. 
As regards contingency, A and B make their choices and take each other into account, while 
at the same time being relativized by a societal definition or collectively accepted 
representation for which C stands. Here, again, it would seem as though Habermas is not very 
far off the mark. He is aware of the societal power of definition associated with “the 
generalized other” not only in its socio-cognitive sense but also in its moral sense. Socio-
cognitively, C represents the collective will in the sense of a group-specific generalized 
imperative, and morally it represents the normative validity and normative authority 
associated with the moral point of view. Yet here too, as in the previous case, a subtle 
difference is of enormous significance. Habermas largely emphasizes the moral dimension 
and downplays or even rejects the socio-cognitive one. This approach constitutes a problem 
in its own right. But in The Theory of Communicative Action (p. 231) he also claims, quite to 
the contrary, that his position constitutes an integration of these very same two dimensions. 
While he still maintains the first position, he has since come to defend the second more often. 
This is the source of a conspicuous ambivalence in Between Facts and Norms and Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen. This ambivalence indicates that, in the final analysis, Habermas 
does not recognize the problem of triple contingency. For this problem consists not simply in 
the fact that C relativizes the perspectives of A and B in that the third perspective compels 
them to take a detour through a symbolic structure, but in particular in the unpredictable 
mediation and integration of the socio-cognitive and the moral in the course of a process of 
deliberation or discourse in a concrete context. In contemporary communication societies, 
what is collectively accepted as valid is neither pre-given nor an immutable transcendent, but 
Published in Sociological Theory 19(2), 2001, pp. 165-86. 
 
16 
 
itself becomes established only in the course of the process. The crucial marker of what is 
collectively accepted as valid in such a concrete context, important to note, is the role of the 
public. This is where the problem of triple contingency asserts itself. According to the 
available evidence, Habermas seems neither willing nor capable of taking this bull by the 
horns, despite the fact that he is the one who has done most to create the conditions for the 
problem of triple contingency to become visible. 
 
In The Theory of Communicative Action, where he discusses the socio-cognitive and moral 
dimensions of the generalized other, Habermas does not only underline the importance of this 
distinction but he also stresses the need to focus on the moral dimension per se. This 
emphasis goes hand in hand with a demotion of the socio-cognitive dimension. Although the 
latter actually concerns not simply the concepts of self and other acquired in the course of 
socialization and individuation but rather the empirically identifiable, historically specific 
socio-cultural context, he nevertheless places a stricture on it. This unaccommodating 
treatment can be attributed to the fact that Habermas takes a position vis-à-vis the socio-
cultural dimension from a moral theoretic standpoint and thus dismisses it together with 
“empiricist ethics” (1987, p. 37). On this faulty basis, he then proceeds to introduce a series 
of distinctions, such as those between imperativistic and normative authority, sanction and 
assent or socially generalized imperatives and intersubjective recognition (1987, pp. 38-9), in 
respect of which he creates the impression as though it were possible to embrace the last 
member of each pair to the exclusion of the first one. Simultaneously, he tends to give the 
first moment an overly empiricist interpretation. In this same vein, he defends moral 
theoretical formalism of a Kantian provenance which he also finds in Durkheim and Mead 
(1987, p. 108). At the same time, however, Habermas advances a claim that is very 
interesting yet contrary to this position of his. He claims that his theory of communicative 
action is an exercise in detranscendentalization: “Through the concept of the lifeworld, the 
sphere of validity claims, which is, according to Parsons, located in a transcendent realm of 
free-floating cultural meanings, would be incorporated from the start into empirical, 
spatiotemporally identifiable contexts of action…If validity claims function, so to speak, as 
pulleys over which consensus formation and thus the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld 
pass, they are, without prejudice to their normative content, installed as social facts - their 
facticity needs no further foundation” (1987, p. 231). In this case, Habermas does not 
distinguish normative validity from the socio-cognitive and related phenomena and then 
select it in preference over the latter, but he maintains them in their interrelationship and 
locates them within socio-cultural reality. Regarding their interrelationship as a property of 
that reality, he thus opens up the possibility of seeing the members of society themselves as 
dealing with this interrelationship, particularly the tension between the two moments, as a 
problem they have to confront and resolve. Taking South Africa under the Apartheid regime 
or Northern Ireland before the Good Friday Agreement as an example, one can see how the 
members of those societies themselves confronted the contradiction between normative 
validity and what is socially accepted and sanctioned in their particular socio-cultural 
contexts, and how they sought to collectively identify, define, address and resolve their 
collective problem. At this point, of course, the problem of triple contingency arises, as is 
suggested by the fact that public communication formed an inherent part of the dynamics of 
both these conflicts and that the definitional power brought to bear on both by international 
observers and more broadly the observing public proved decisive. Through the public, 
epistemic structures came into operation under specific socio-cultural conditions. Yet there is 
no evidence to suggest that the problem as such enters Habermas’ purview. Despite the 
potential of this second proposal, the first position is the one that he predominantly 
represents. The critique of neo-Kantianism that he levels against Parsons would seem, 
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ironically, to apply in a certain sense to himself as well. The preoccupation with validity, 
earlier championed by such neo-Kantians as Heinrich Rickert and Emile Lask, undoubtedly 
predominates. 
 
As the different titles of the German and English editions of Habermas’ latest major work 
suggest, the second of the above-mentioned two proposals is taken up so that the tension 
between “facticity and validity” (Habermas 1992) or “between facts and norms” (Habermas 
1997) becomes its main theme. This is a promising start that fills one with the expectation 
that the problem of triple contingency is going to be addressed directly, yet the highly 
interesting and instructive book, which deals with relevant topics such as discourse or 
deliberarion, public opinion- and will-formation, decision-making, and even the public, turns 
out to be a disappointment in this regard. Against the foil of an overview of the linguistic turn 
in reaction to psychologism and of his appropriation of Peirce’s work for the purposes of his 
own theory of the communication community, Habermas (1997, pp. 17-27) reasserts the 
detranscendentalizing thrust of his project. For him, the idealizations built into language 
through its meaning and especially validity enter the constitution of the social reality of social 
interactions networked in space and time through communicative action. Although being 
unavoidable presuppositions anticipating ideal situations, they are made effective in 
interaction in so far as the illocutionary binding force of speech acts is brought into play to 
co-ordinate the actions of the participants. Communicative action allows the counterfactual 
assumptions of the actors, who are oriented toward the validity claims raised by themselves 
and the other participants, to become immediately effective in the construction and 
maintenance of social order, which itself consists of the recognition of normative validity 
claims. A careful reading of the opening sections of the book already reveals that Habermas 
is here all the time thinking of double contingency and participants in interaction seeking to 
overcome the “risk of dissension” it poses, while the generalized other is relevant only as the 
seat of idealizations in the form of validity claims. This means that he is overlooking the 
problem of triple contingency. Missing from his account is the middle level between the 
participants, one the one hand, and the sphere of validity, on the other. What is lacking is the 
third person perspective in the guise of the public who plays a decisive role in every concrete 
socio-cultural context in the contemporary world in determining how the validity claims take 
effect in public communication and what is eventually collectively accepted. Instead of 
addressing the problem of triple contingency directly, Habermas arrests the dynamism that 
the public brings into the social process, thus making its outcome less than predictable, by 
introducing modern law as the mechanism by means of which the tension between facticity 
and validity, which in the modern context multiplies the risk of dissension, is stabilized. 
There is of course no sense in denying the significance of law, but, considering the problem 
at hand in its contemporary manifestation,
7
 Habermas’ solution is a conservative one that fits 
well into neo-classical sociology and, by the same token, ignores a central problem of 
contemporary sociology. 
 
At first sight, the thesis of the missing public in Habermas seems preposterous in respect of 
an author who has made such a monumental contribution to the theory of die Öffentlichkeit, 
the public sphere, publicity or the public. It is by no means my intention to question the 
significance of his work on this topic, from the early The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere (1969) through Toward a Rational Society (1971a, particularly Chapter 5) to 
the very important recent Between Facts and Norms (1997, particularly Chapter 7 and 8), but 
there is room for a subtler point to be made. To begin with, it should be noted that there is a 
difference between “the public sphere” and “the public”, and that Habermas is interested in 
the former rather than the latter. The public sphere refers to a communication structure that is 
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generated by communicative action and takes the form of a network for the communication 
of opinions which become synthesized in public communication as public opinion. As such, 
it is the social space in which public communication takes place and within which the various 
participants as well as the public appear. The public, on the other hand, is a collective noun 
that designates people who are recruited from the private sphere of civil society, which is 
complementary to the public sphere, to serve as the carrier of the public sphere. As such, the 
public forms the internal structure of the public sphere. Although Habermas is less concerned 
with the public, he nevertheless has some interesting things to say about it (1997, pp. 307-8, 
327-87). The public presents itself in different forms, depending on the level of 
differentiation of communication processes. While the presupposition of physical presence 
applies at the lower levels, such as encounters and simple social interaction, the public 
becomes progressively generalized and more abstract as the level of differentiation increases, 
up to the point that it is transformed into an unlimited body of absent and anonymous 
addressees in the case of generalized communication processes in complex societies. Under 
these conditions, the public is unified by the mass media on a national scale or even more 
globally. Irrespective of the form it takes, the public is crucial to democracy in so far as it 
possesses communicative power and a certain authority which are essential to the generation 
of the legitimacy of the formal decision-making system. While democratic opinion- and will-
formation is an institutionalized process that goes far beyond the public, it is in a crucial 
respect dependent on an input from the informal communication or non-institutionalized 
spontaneous opinion-formation of the public located on the periphery. This process starts 
with the perception, identification and thematization of a collective problem, and is continued 
with the insertion of the concomitantly formed informal opinions into public communication. 
In this context, political actors, actors representing their own interests (e.g. industry) and 
actors representing the public (e.g. associations, movements, churches, etc.) take part in a 
controversy in the public sphere in which they struggle over political influence over what is 
collectively accepted as valid. While this controversy follows a collective communicative 
practise structured by rules, the public is of particular importance in this communicative 
conflict since its authority, represented by its resonance, approval, agreement or lack of it, is 
decisive in determining the collective definition of the problem at issue as well as which 
actors’ influence will count in the formal decision-making process. The public opinion 
eventually resulting from the collective communicative and discursive working through of 
the available proposals, information and reasons in a more or less rational way, finally 
delineates the manoeuvre space of the formal decision-making system and indicates the 
direction to be taken. 
 
It should be emphasized that this outline of Habermas’ position on the public has been 
arrived at by bringing together a series of isolated statements that he made in the course of an 
extended, largely descriptive account of the role of civil society and the political public 
sphere in democratic processes within constitutional states. As is clear, it contains very 
important insights about the constitutive sense of the public within the public sphere and of 
its authority in the process of public opinion- and will-formation. Yet these insights are 
neither developed nor integrated in a systematic way into the overall account offered in 
Between Facts and Norms. So, for instance, it cannot be said that Habermas presents an 
analysis in which the public is given its rightful role. Nowhere does he allow it to come in 
between the participants in public controversy or discourse, on the one hand, and the sphere 
of validity which they activate through their communicative action in the public sphere, on 
the other. Neither its constitutive role nor its authority leaves any trace whatsoever on the 
recognition and acceptance of the validity claims advanced by the various participants in 
public communication. At no point do validity and the communicative power of the public 
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meet and become interconnected so as to form what is collectively accepted. In effect, the 
public does not have any significant role to play in Habermas’ overall analysis. For this 
reason, it could with justification be said to be missing. Although he grants that, as against 
the idealizations built into language, we have to reckon with “the world we know”, with “the 
facticity of a world…that is differently organized” (1997, p. 325, tanslation modified), his 
major tendency is nevertheless to argue in favour of the efficacy of these idealizations and 
their direct translatability into social order (1997, p. 17). Although he admits that public 
opinion results from a collective practice interrelating institutionalized and non-
institutionalized communicative processes in which proposals, information and reasons are 
collectively worked through in a “more or less rational” (1997, p. 362) - i.e., a not entirely 
rational - way, he is nevertheless inclined to proceed as though communication processes to 
which the role of the public is central can be approached in terms of the final consensus - 
envisaged from the moral point of view - they presuppose. The leading image of his most 
recent major work, the Kantian-Rousseauian model of “self-legislation” asserting an identity 
between the author and the addressee of the law (1997, pp. 33, 38, 104, 120, 126, 408, 417), 
together with the numerous argumentative conclusions drawn from it, is sufficient to show 
that Habermas has in mind a solution to the problem of double contingency that precludes the 
unpredictability and instability associated with triple contingency. That the complaint 
sounded here is not simply an empiricist one calling for a focus on facticity is made clear in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
The main thrust of Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, at least of the most substantial essays 
from the collection, turns on what Habermas calls “the third perspective” (1996, pp. 108-111; 
see also pp. 15, 106, 114, 120, 122, 125). Also here a careful study of the material reveals 
difficulties similar to those noted above, but in this context they take on shape around the 
question of the precise location of the third perspective. Habermas describes the third point of 
view as “a perspective which is located in society itself” (p. 122). It is an inner-worldly 
remainder in everyday moral intuitions of the transcendent point of view of God which was 
lost when the religious world view broke down in favour of the proliferation of cultural 
models in pluralistic societies. As such it represents something like a “transcendence from 
within” (p. 16; see also Habermas 1997, p. 17). Forming part of an immanent communication 
structure, it is a “public, intersubjectively shared perspective” (p. 106), the perspective “from 
which we, the citizens, collectively and publicly deliberate about what is in the best interest 
of everyone” (p. 109). It is the perspective that “the members of post-traditional societies 
themselves intuitively assume when the only option left to them in the face of problematic 
basic moral norms is to fall back upon rational grounds” (p. 15). He also describes it as “a 
social perspective” (p. 39) which is embedded in the intersubjectively shared practical 
knowledge on which actors draw in the lifeworld. In a critique of John Rawls, he adds to this 
interpretation of the third point of view a surprizing twist - surprizing, because he takes a step 
beyond double contingency and effectively begins to formulate the problem of triple 
contingency. As against Rawls, who from his liberal position conceives of private individuals 
engaging in the public political use of reason and of letting their own particular motives count 
in the debate, Habermas takes a stance at the level of public communication as such in order 
to bring out the epistemic role of practical discourse (pp. 102-3, 114; see also pp. 15, 46, 60, 
63). Private points of view, personal interests and values indeed enter discourse in the form of 
motives, but in the course of the process both their role and their meaning undergo a change. 
Something individual is transformed into something shared by all. Only in such a new form 
do motives acquire the epistemic status of rules or structures that possess the authority to 
regulate the situation at large. With this statement Habermas opens a vista on triple 
contingency - on the role not only of direct participants but in particular also of the public, on 
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an intersubjectively shared vocabulary for the translation of individual desires and 
preferences into something situationally meaningful and effective, on something collectively 
acceptable and collectively valid, and finally on situational epistemic structures in the form of 
rules or arguments regulating the situation in a generally acceptable way. But no sooner has 
he opened this vista than he turns away to follow his standard and by now characteristic path. 
Instead of maintaining a stereoscopic perspective, he casts the third perspective in the 
constraining mould of the philosopher’s moral point of view and thus narrows it down to a 
one-dimensional construct that has little or nothing to do with the public. This is how he for 
the most part presents the third perspective. 
 
The third perspective, in the sense of the moral point of view, is a reconstruction of the lost 
transcendent point of view of God or, rather, of the point of view intuitively taken by the 
members of post-traditional societies when they are faced with normative questions (pp. 15, 
16, 38-9, 56, 122). In conflicts, for instance, people engage in practical discourses in which 
they struggle against one another with reasons, even though their common substantive 
background consensus has broken down (pp. 27, 56, 99). Moral philosophy, particularly in 
the discourse ethical variant Habermas represents together with Karl-Otto Apel,
8
 starts with 
the members of society or the citizenry, particularly with their moral intuitions, and finds its 
own point of view already available among them, but it is only by painstaking reconstructive 
analysis that it is able to purify it in the form of the moral point of view. Reconstruction 
involves more than simply taking on board the prevalent convictions of a population or the 
already existing basic consensus in liberal societies. It requires the bringing to awareness of 
implicit or pre-theoretical practical knowledge already available in a cultural form and in 
social practices. What is brought to the fore are the form and the structure of perspectives of 
intact intersubjective communicative relations, the structure and procedures of a process by 
means of which generally acceptable norms can be discovered or constructed. This 
reconstruction is achieved by means of a reflexive exercise that proceeds in a critical manner. 
The result of such a reconstruction of the intuitive practical knowledge of the members of 
society is the moral point of view from which alone an impartial evaluation or judgement can 
be made of duties, norms, obligations and, more broadly, questions of justice (pp. 40, 48, 55, 
102, 117, 120, 122). It is this point of view, which discourse ethics is designed to justify (pp. 
56-64), that Habermas (pp. 96, 120) is convinced must be accepted by the members of society 
or the citizens to the exclusion or, at least, independent of their own particular world views if 
they were to arrive at a shared political conception and common standard of justice. The 
moral point of view, and it alone, possesses the necessary epistemic authority that makes it 
independent of particular points of view (p. 117). Habermas consistently maintains the 
primacy of the moral point of view understood in this sense, and equally consistently insists 
that the members of society or the citizenry must adopt this point of view so as to be able to 
organize their society in a reasonable way. Yet he is adamant that he does not entertain or 
perpetuate a philosophical paternalism (pp. 119, 122). This dementi is not convincing, 
however, and it will remain so until he revises that basic assumption of his which leads him 
to give priority to the moral philosophical third point of view to the exclusion of the third 
perspective of the members of society or the citizenry. 
 
The basic assumption I have in mind is related generally to Habermas’ indefatigable attempt 
to uncouple the moral point of view, which concerns the horizontal perspective in which 
interpersonal relations are regulated, from the ethical point of view, which concerns the 
vertical perspective of particular life styles and projects. More particularly, it is related to the 
concomitant argument that the abstract moral question transcends the context-bound ethical 
question (e.g. 1996, p 43). The assumption that Habermas makes here is that when the 
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members of society raise questions, they typically raise ethical questions, even when they 
could be expected to raise moral questions, and that if they at all raise moral questions, they 
do so in an intuitive, unreflective and uncritical way that requires philosophical leadership 
and correction. This is an untenable assumption
9
 that leads Habermas astray, despite his 
laudable attempt to locate the third perspective in society itself. It misleads him not merely 
into underestimating the third perspective carried by the public but even into philosophically 
appropriating the latter to such as degree that it in effect is relegated to oblivion. These 
difficulties would seem, in turn, to be connected with a selective utilization of the structure of 
communication. 
 
A characteristic argumentative strategy of Habermas is to draw on the structure of 
communication by way of the system of perspectives which is reflected in the different 
attitudes and personal pronouns. In these terms, he typically argues that the social world is 
accessible only from the performative perspective of the participants, while the objective 
world calls for description from the perspective of the observer (e.g.Habermas 1996, p. 55). 
To these two Habermas adds the third perspective which he regards as “an impartial 
perspective…[which]…transcends the participatory perspective of the citizens” in that it 
represents “a comprehensive, intersubjectively shared perspective” (1996, p. 120; see also pp. 
106, 109). It is this perspective that he emphatically calls “the moral perspective” which is 
the preserve of a reconstructively proceeding moral philosophy. In his critique of Rawls, 
Habermas (1996, pp. 95-127) repeatedly attacks the American author’s proposal to regard the 
citizens as assuming both a participatory perspective and an observer’s perspective from 
which they respectively generalize their own positions and observe that others have done the 
same. His objection is that Rawls recognizes only two perspectives, while the third 
perspective still needs to be brought in. If one now recalls Habermas’ own analysis of the 
structure of communication presented above, however, then the erroneous nature of this 
argument becomes apparent immediately. What is lacking in Habermas is the perspective of 
the public who is not directly participating but is rather observing what those participating at 
the time are saying and doing and who is simultaneously evaluatively responding in such a 
way that it provides the resonance essential to the establishment of public opinion and what is 
eventually accepted as collectively accepted. This is the social observer’s perspective, This is 
what Rawls seems to be have in mind, rather than the neutral objectivist observer’s 
perspective that Habermas suggests Rawls is working with.
10
 It must be pointed out that the 
third point of view is not in addition to the participants’ and the observer’s perspectives, but 
in addition to the first person and the second person perspectives. Habermas obliterates the 
public and the third perspective it embodies by assimilating it at times to the participants, as 
when he thinks of all the citizens taking part in deliberation, and at other times to the 
philosopher’s moral point of view, as when he thinks of the impartial point of view that 
transcends the participatory perspective of the citizenry. Also here in Habermas’ very recent 
work, in which he explicitly attempts to locate the third point of view within society itself, 
there is no room for the public and its characteristic third, social observer’s point of view. 
The irony is, however, that the philosopher’s third perspective is a reconstruction of the 
public’s point of view and, therefore, owes virtually everything to it. 
 
What is put forward here is, of course, only a supporting argument for the main argument of 
the paper. The latter is that Habermas, in the most central core of his very significant 
contribution to sociological theory, crosses the path of the problem of triple contingency 
several times yet fails to recognize and to deal with it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Habermas proceeds in both his major works of the last two decades containing his very 
considerable contribution to sociology from the theorem of double contingency which had 
been established by Mead and Schutz and formulated by Parsons. In fact, both The Theory of 
Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms can be regarded as an attempt to 
clarify what the theoretical solution to the problem posed by the fact of double contingency 
must be if the sociologist were to be in a position to account for social order and hence for 
society. In the former work, the solution to the risk of dissension is conceived in terms of the 
communicative co-ordination of actions, and in the latter, where the tension between facticity 
and validity is seen as being superimposed on the primary risk of dissension and hence 
exacerbating it, the same theory is extended to law. In the case of both co-ordination and law, 
the solution is theoretically found in the moral dimension or the dimension of normative 
validity. The sustained attempt to find a solution to the risk of dissension in the realms of a 
sociological theory of order, and thus to pursue a classically posed problem, places Habermas 
among the neo-classical sociologists. The solution itself also resembles the proposal of a neo-
classical predecessor. There indeed is a vast difference between Parsons’ emphasis on 
cultural determination and Habermas’ alternative of a common orientation to validity claims. 
But if one appreciates that the key interpretative factor is their common neo-Kantian 
attachment, then it becomes immediately clear that Habermas’ solution is tantamount to 
Parsons’ consensus displaced to a different, somewhat more fluid level. Behind the apparent 
fluidity of validity claims carried in communicative action, however, lurks the paternalistic 
philosopher preoccupied with validity in the form of the moral point of view. It is this 
position, entailing a rationalistic moral philosophical or moralistic fallacy, that prevents 
Habermas from recognizing and addressing the problem of triple contingency to which his 
work gives rise. It systematically leads him, while proceeding from double contingency, to 
jump too rapidly to the moral point of view to attend to the risk of dissension, thus 
overlooking the problem of triple contingency. 
 
All along the path of the development of his core contribution to sociology, Habermas 
intermittently touches on the problem of triple contingency. In his analysis of double 
contingency, in the preparation of his own theoretical basis in the structure of 
communication, in his reformulation of double contingency and the elaboration of a solution 
to it, in his proposal to build validity claims as social fact into concrete contexts, in his 
analysis of the legally secured discursive process in contemporary democratic societies, in his 
attempt to clarify the precise location of the third point of view - in all these contexts, he on 
occasion presses beyond his well-entrenched position, only to withdraw to more familiar 
ground at that very moment that he is required to confront the problem of triple contingency. 
In more specific terms, this means that in his all too strong emphasis on the philosopher’s 
moral point of view, he overwhelmingly tends to obliterate the role of the public as a vehicle 
of the third point of view and thus to arrest the dynamism, but also the unpredictability and 
instability, that the public brings into the communicatively deploying and discursively 
organized social process. As a neo-classical sociologist, Habermas may be seen as an 
historical figure among contemporary sociologists, but as a theorist whose work consistently 
points toward a problem he himself is unwilling or unable to deal with, he bequeaths a 
valuable asset to his successors. This is the problem of triple contingency. 
 
As a contemporary sociological problem, triple contingency as such obviously requires basic 
theoretical attention, but there is also various other matters that need systematic work. The 
first is the role of the public in communications societies. Another related but broader 
question is the unpredictable and unstable process in which what is collectively accepted as 
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valid actually becomes established, what the role of the public is in this, and how this occurs. 
An important part of this work involves the detailed investigation of particular discursive 
situational structures or the cognitive, knowledge or epistemic structures operating in 
discursive situations. Instead of contenting oneself with establishing that morality has a 
cognitive quality or that moral statements express knowledge (e.g. Habermas 1996, p. 11), it 
is essential to investigate precisely what this quality entails or what this knowledge is. Instead 
of asserting the “epistemic core of normative validity” (Habermas 1996, p. 15) from a 
philosophically conceived third point of view, a study of these epistemic structures needs to 
be conducted from a social scientifically conceived third point of view. A phenomenological 
analysis of the content people associate with their own moral statements in conflict situations 
(Habermas 1996, p. 11) will not be sufficient. It demands that situational structures be much 
more broadly considered in their manifestation as at one and the same time micro and macro 
phenomena, as at one and the same time in people’s statements, in social practices and in 
cultural models. If the third point of view, for instance, is studied sociologically in the form 
of such situational structures, then the moral point of view can be directly related to the role 
of the public in communication societies without a loss of its epistemic core. Perhaps the 
most challenging aspect of the task implied by triple contingency, however, will be to 
reconstruct the evolution of such discursive situational structures according to the new 
concept of evolution that is emerging in the wake of the exposure of the fallacious nature of 
Habermas’ developmental logical theory of evolution (Strydom 1992, 1993). 
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NOTES 
 
This essay was conceived and initially sketched in Berlin during a research sojourn in the 
early part of 1998. I wish to express my gratitude to all those who had made it possible, 
particularly Prof Klaus Eder of the Humboldt University for institutional, intellectual and 
personal support, and University College Cork for leave of absence and financial support. 
The essay also benefited from a discussion I had with Prof Karl-Otto Apel, professor of 
philosophy emeritus, University of Frankfurt, in June 1998, for which I wish to thank him 
most sincerely. 
 
1 For the purposes of this paper, however, I make use of the 1997 edition of Between Facts 
and Norms. 
2 While I borrow the concept of triple contingency from Eder and Schmidtke (1997, p. 17) 
who link “eine dreifache Kontingenz” to the role of the observer of interaction neglected in 
classical action theory, I propose to develop it in relation to the role of the public in 
communication societies. On this proposal, see Strydom (1999). I disagree with their 
judgement, however, that Luhmann’s systems theory covers the problem of observation 
adequately. 
3 An explanation for Parsons’ reluctance to mention Schutz might perhaps be found in the 
misunderstanding that dogged their relationship. See Grathoff (1978). 
4 Although not mentioned it explicitly, Habermas deals extensively and in detail with the 
concept of double contingency, both in his analysis of Mead’s different versions and in his 
own proposal (Habermas 1987, pp. 8-9, 11, 13, 26, 35-6, 58-9). 
5 For his earlier analysis of Mead, see Habermas (1988, pp. 63-66). 
6 For his earlier analysis of Schutz, see Habermas (1988, pp. 106-9). 
7 Here I have in mind the role that the public today plays in communication societies. 
8 The difference between Apel and Habermas is that while Apel insists that he is a 
transcendental philosopher (personal communication, Niedernhausen, Germany, June 20, 
1998), Habermas is critical of so-called “foundationalism” and seeks to accommodate the 
different perspectives of both the philosopher and the social scientist. In Between Facts and 
Norms (1997, pp. 6-7) he tries to make a virtue if this, although his characteristic emphasis is 
nevertheless conceptual and normative. 
9 It is untenable at least in so far as it is given a stronger form than is required to justify 
engagement in intellectual work. 
10 My argument, however, is not intended to be read as being in favour of Rawls instead. 
